THROUGH THE PFC PRISM
The Business Travel Coalition (BTC) today called on the U.S. Congress, in reauthorizing the Federal Aviation Administration, to reject airlines’ arguments that increasing the Passenger Facility Charge (PFC) would harm demand for travel. As with Kevin Spacey’s character Frank Underwood, in Netflix’s House of Cards, there is always more than meets the eye when it comes to interpreting airlines’ intentions in Washington debates. Airlines argue that increasing the PFC by $4.00 will meaningfully dampen demand for travel. However, when airlines state “passengers should not be further burdened” that is when one really needs to pay attention.
Indeed, airlines cannot in reality be concerned with a $4.00 increase to the PFC and its impact on demand. If they were this sensitive to such a small increase - the first PFC cap increase since 2000 - they would have endeavored, for example, to aggressively stimulate demand in 2011 when the federal ticket tax lapsed. Instead, they raised base fares and pocketed a $28.5 million dollar windfall per day. Likewise, take the blizzard of new and increasing ancillary fees, ranging up to $200.00 – demand remains at record levels. Or, take the decline in jet fuel prices, the enduring fuel surcharges and the continued airline appetite for fare hikes. Time Magazine, for example, reported on October 21, 2014, ”The big carriers announced a $4 per ticket price increase Tuesday, even as falling jet fuel prices were delivering an unbudgeted bonus.” There is often little correlation between airlines’ rhetoric and their behavior.
In fact, the PFC debate has everything to do with airlines wanting control of everything - the passenger, the corporate travel department, the travel agent, the distribution system, the U.S. DOT, their regulator, Congressional delegations from hub airport states, relevant Congressional committees, the press, foreign Open Skies partners and airports. Now that they have secured their antitrust-immunized global alliances and domestic consolidation they especially want to control capacity and competition. For example, some airlines have applied unprecedented political pressure to block Norwegian Air International’s application to serve the U.S. and have lobbied the Obama Administration to protect them from competition from the Gulf carriers. This power-play behavior over PFC funding is all about airlines seeking control over domestic and foreign competition, i.e. investments in airports that can add capacity and attract new airlines, which in turn increases competition and consumer choice and lowers fares.
Airlines need to understand that they are just one stakeholder among many in this debate. The U.S. has a national-policy goal of increasing foreign tourists from 75 million annually today to 100 million by 2021. In reaching that goal, millions of good jobs will have been created, but we will need to compete with other countries for tourists and as such we will need modern, efficient and customer-oriented airports. If airlines control the PFC level, as sure as the sun rises in the East, they will do for the airport experience what they have done for the cabin experience.
Congress should use the PFC debate as a prism through which to understand that the U.S. airline industry is in its endgame phase where some airline participants seek to 1) control price transparency by withholding ancillary fee information, 2) control its regulator, the U.S. DOT, by undermining its consumer-protection authority and 3) control competitive entry and capacity by blocking foreign carriers and sabotaging the PFC increase. Even Frank Underwood would wince at this aggressive airline behavior.
Read additional BTC analysis on this issue at http://www.businesstravelcoalition.com/press-room/2015/march-4---are-airlines.html.